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the Good: The Mental
Health Act 2001 (Part 2)
Anselm Eldergill1
§1 – INTRODUCTION
This is the second of two articles examining the Mental Health Act 2001, the main piece of mental health
legislation in the Republic of Ireland. The first article, published in the previous edition of the journal,
dealt with the new admission, detention, leave and transfer provisions2. This concluding article examines
the new safeguards: the Mental Health Commission and the new tribunal and consent to treatment
procedures.
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§1 – CONSENT TO TREATMENT
As a general statement, the consent to treatment procedures in the 2001 Act offer weaker protection for
patients than those in force in England and Wales (Mental Health Act 1983), Scotland (Mental Health (Care
and Treatment) Scotland Act 2003) and Northern Ireland (Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986).
As with these other Acts, there are specific procedures concerning psychosurgery, ECT, medication, and
‘other’ treatments.
Definition of ‘consent’
What constitutes ‘consent’ is defined in section 56. It ‘means consent obtained freely without threats or
inducements, where:
(a) the consultant psychiatrist responsible for … the patient is satisfied that [s/he] … is capable of
understanding the nature, purpose and likely effects of the proposed treatment; and
1 Solicitor; President of the Mental Health Lawyers Association; President of the Institute of Mental Health Act Practitioners.
Visiting Professor, Law School, Northumbria University.
2 See Journal of Mental Health Law, May 2008, pp 21–37.
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(b) the consultant psychiatrist has given the patient adequate information, in a form and language
that the patient can understand, on the nature, purpose and likely effects of the proposed
treatment.’
Requirement (b) is not found in the 1983 Act and is a useful statutory protection.
Whether particular conduct constitutes a ‘threat or inducement’ may be difficult to determine. For
example, what is the position where a consultant tells a patient who is unwilling to have ECT that the
consultant is likely to be in a position to revoke the order following a course of ECT? Is this an
inducement, part of the duty to give ‘adequate information’ about the likely effects of the treatment on
the patient’s mental state and symptoms, or both of these things? If the patient then consents, has that
consent been obtained freely, which is arguably not quite the same thing as being given freely?
Psychosurgery
Section 58 provides that psychosurgery shall not be performed on a patient unless the patient consents
in writing to the psychosurgery and it is authorised by a tribunal.
The tribunal must review any proposal for psychosurgery. Having done this, it must either (a) authorise
the psychosurgery ‘if it is satisfied that it is in the best interests of the health of the patient concerned’,’
or (b) if it is not so satisfied, refuse to authorise it.
Again, the drafting is rather loose. What is the position where a tribunal is satisfied that psychosurgery is
in the best interests of the health of the patient but not that the patient has capacity to consent to the
treatment? In other words, the tribunal is of the opinion that the patient is not capable of understanding
the nature, purpose and likely effects of the proposed treatment. Although the tribunal believes that the
patient’s signed consent is legally worthless, as drafted this is not a matter for it. Likewise, what is the
position where the tribunal believes that the patient’s written consent was not obtained freely or that they
were not given adequate information? Again, as drafted these are not matters which affect the tribunal’s
decision.
A second problem concerns the definition of ‘a patient.’ The psychosurgery safeguards, and Part 4
generally, only apply to ‘patients’. According to the interpretation section, ‘a person to whom an
admission order relates is referred to in this Act as “a patient.”’
It is strange that the definition of a patient does not also refer to people who are subject to renewal orders.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the consent procedures apply equally to people whose admission orders have
been renewed. No other interpretation is tenable given the renewable 3-month medication periods
referred to in section 60.
What though of voluntary patients, some of whom may lack capacity to consent to having the treatment?
Is the statutory intention that psychosurgery given to a voluntary patient does not need to be authorised
by a tribunal because the recipient is not ‘a patient’ for the purposes of the 2001 Act? Given the drafting
and the ambit of consent provisions in similar jurisdictions, it seems unlikely that ‘voluntary patients’ are
‘patients’ for the purposes of the ECT and medication safeguards in Part 4. Is the legal position the same
therefore as concerns psychosurgery?
Electro-convulsive therapy
Section 59 provides that a programme of electro-convulsive therapy shall not be administered to a patient
unless either s/he has consented in writing to its administration or (if unable or unwilling to consent) it
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has been approved by the patient’s consultant and ‘authorised … by another consultant psychiatrist
following referral of the matter to him or her’ by the former.
The fact that the patient’s consultant nominates the second-opinion doctor is an obvious weakness, and
this part of the Part 4 scheme duplicates the scheme in Northern Ireland.
As with psychosurgery, one problem in practice may be too flexible an approach as to what constitutes
consent. The key factual issue is usually not whether the person has signed a consent form but whether
they had capacity to understand what they were signing, and capacity to understand the nature, purpose
and likely effects of the treatment referred to in it. One must also then look at the adequacy of the
information they were given.
The 2001 Act provides that a programme of ECT shall not be administered except in accordance with
rules made by the Commission. These rules are the Rules Governing the Use of Electro-Convulsive Therapy
(R-S59(2)/01/2006) (Mental Health Commission, Dublin, 1 November 2006).
There is also a code of practice on giving ECT to voluntary patients: Code of Practice Governing the Use
of Electro-Convulsive Therapy for Voluntary Patients (COP-S33/02/2008) (Mental Health Commission,
Dublin, January 2008).
Medication
Section 60 deals with giving medication for mental disorder. It is poorly drafted:
60.– Where medicine has been administered to a patient for the purposes of ameliorating his or her
mental disorder for a continuous period of 3 months, the administration of that medicine shall not be
continued unless either–
(a) the patient gives his or her consent in writing to the continued administration of that medicine,
or
(b) where the patient is unable or unwilling to give such consent–
(i) the continued administration of that medicine is approved by the consultant psychiatrist
responsible for the care and treatment of the patient, and
(ii) the continued administration of that medicine is authorised (in a form specified by the
Commission) by another consultant psychiatrist following referral of the matter to him or her by the
first-mentioned psychiatrist,
and the consent, or as the case may be, approval and authorisation shall be valid for a period of 3
months and thereafter for periods of 3 months, if, in respect of each period, the like consent or, as the
case may be, approval and authorisation is obtained.
The statutory scheme for medication is therefore essentially the same as for ECT: treatment requires the
patient’s consent or, if they are unable or unwilling to consent, the authorisation of a second consultant.
Several difficulties arise in addition to those already raised above about the quality of any consent
apparently given in writing.
What is the position if a patient consents to further medication at the three-month point but then, a
month later, seeks to withdraw the consent on experiencing unpleasant side-effects? As drafted, the
scheme seems to allow the treatment to continue for a further two months before a second opinion is
required.
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Consider then the case of a patient who refuses further treatment with risperidone at the three-month
point. The patient’s consultant approves its continued administration and a second consultant authorises
it. A month later the consultant changes the antipsychotic to olanzapine. Is a further second-opinion
required at this stage? The wording of section 60 – ‘the administration of that medicine shall not be
continued …’ suggests that a second-opinion in respect of olanzapine is only required three-months after
‘that medication’ is started.
Similarly, what if a patient detained on 1 January is prescribed antipsychotic X, this is changed to
antipsychotic Y on 1 February, and then on 1 March antipsychotic Y is replaced by antipsychotic Z? Is it
the case that she is now not entitled to a second opinion until she has been on antipsychotic Z for three
months?
Other treatments
The general position is that treatments other than those specified above require the patient’s consent.
There is, however, a caveat in relation to incapacitated patients. A patient’s consent is not required if s/he
is incapable of consenting to the treatment by reason of their mental disorder and, in the opinion of their
consultant psychiatrist, the treatment is necessary to safeguard their life; to restore their health; to
alleviate their condition; or to relieve their suffering.
Seclusion and restraint
Section 69(1) provides that a person shall not place a ‘patient’ in seclusion or apply mechanical means of
bodily restraint unless such seclusion or restraint is determined, in accordance with the rules made by the
Commission, to be necessary for the purposes of treatment or to prevent the patient from injuring
themselves or others and unless the seclusion or restraint complies with such rules. The term ‘patient’
here expressly includes a voluntary patient and a child in respect of whom an order under section 25 is
in force.
The relevant rules are the Rules Governing the use of Seclusion and Mechanical Means of Bodily Restraint (R-
S69 (2)/02/2006) (Mental Health Commission, Dublin, 1 November 2006). There is also a Code of
Practice on the Use of Physical Restraint in Approved Centres (COP-S33(3)/02/2006) (Mental Health
Commission, Dublin, 1 November 2006).
§2 – MENTAL HEALTH COMMISSION
The Mental Health Commission is the key body in terms of ensuring the proper operation of the Act, and
safeguarding the rights of citizens under the statute.
Constitution
By section 35, the Commission consists of 13 members appointed by the Minister. Of the members, there
must be one practising barrister or solicitor; three registered medical practitioners; two registered nurses;
one social worker; one psychologist; one representative of the general public; three representatives of
voluntary bodies; and one health board chief executive. There must be at least four female and four male
members. Members of the Commission hold office for a period not exceeding five years.
Functions
The Commission’s functions include appointing tribunals and tribunal members; establishing the tribunal
panel of consultant psychiatrists; arranging a legal aid scheme for patients; preparing and reviewing a code
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of practice; appointing the Inspector of Mental Health Services; maintaining a register of approved
centres; prescribing statutory forms; prosecuting offences; and making rules concerning the use of
seclusion and mechanical restraint.
Statistics
The Commission has published a number of very useful papers summarising the use made of the Act and
the judgments of the High Court. These can be found on its website: www.mhcirl.ie.
There were 388 transitional patients detained under the Mental Treatment Act, 1945 on the
commencement date. In the 11 month period from 1 November 2006 to end September 2007 there were
1,894 admission orders and 1,101 renewal orders were made. There were 1,902 Mental Health Tribunal
hearings during that period and 19 appeals to the Circuit Court against tribunal decisions, of which five
reached the hearing stage.3 It appears that none of these five appeals were successful.
§3 – MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNALS
The Mental Health Commission must be sent a copy of any admission or renewal order within 24 hours.
On receiving its copy, the Commission arranges for the patient’s case to be reviewed by a Mental Health
Tribunal.
The Commission assigns a legal representative and directs a member of the medical panel to examine the
patient. The doctor appointed has 14 days within which to examine the patient, interview the consultant,
inspect the patient’s records and prepare a report for the tribunal.
The tribunal must conduct its review and make its decision within 21 days of the making of the order. 
It must affirm the order if it is satisfied that the patient is suffering from mental disorder and that any
failure to comply with the statutory admission or renewal procedures has not caused injustice or affected
the substance of the order.
Constitution and administration
The Act provides that the Commission shall from time to time appoint one or more tribunals, each of
which shall be known as a Mental Health Tribunal, to determine such matters as may be referred to it by
the Commission under section 17. Under the Act, the matters that may be referred to a tribunal are
review proceedings following the making of an admission or renewal order; proposals to transfer a patient
to the Central Mental Hospital; and proposals for psychosurgery.
Each tribunal consists of three members: a practising barrister or solicitor of 7 years standing, who acts as
the chairperson; a consultant psychiatrist; and a lay member.
The Commission has devised Procedural Guidance & Administrative Protocols for tribunals.
The terms on which members are appointed
The terms of appointment may be problematic. Section 48 provides that a member of a tribunal shall hold
office for such period not exceeding three years. Furthermore, a tribunal member ‘may at any time be
removed … by the Commission if, in the Commission’s opinion, … his or her removal appears to the
Commission to be necessary for the effective performance by the tribunal of its functions.’
3 See Summary of Article 40.4 Judgments since Commencement of the Mental Health Act 2001, Mental Health Commission,
Dublin (24 October 2007), p.1.
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A tribunal appointment is therefore a part-time appointment for three years made by a non-judicial body,
which can remove the member at any time if it believes this is necessary for the effective performance of
the tribunal’s functions. Whether this appointment scheme complies with the minimum requirements of
the European Convention on Human Rights must be doubtful. For example, in Findlay v United
Kingdom(1997) 24 EHRR 221 at para. 73, the court stated that, ‘In order to establish whether a tribunal
can be considered as “independent”, regard must be had inter alia to the manner of appointment of its
members and their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question
whether the body presents an appearance of independence.’
The general principle is that a person exercising judicial functions should not be placed in a position
where her or his freedom to discharge those functions without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, might
be or appear to be jeopardised by his relationship with the executive. The fact that the Mental Health
Tribunals are only quasi-judicial bodies was hinted at in MR v Cathy Byrne & Others, Sligo Mental Health
Services Respondent) and Mental Health Tribunal (Notice Party) (2 March 2007),4 where Mr Justice Neill
said that, ‘The principal reform is the establishment of the Mental Health Commission and Mental
Health Tribunals, thus providing for a quasi-judicial intervention for the purposes of the independent
review of detention of persons in approved centres alleged to be suffering from “mental disorders”.’
Panel of psychiatrists
The Act requires the Commission to establish a panel of consultant psychiatrists to carry out independent
medical examinations under section 17.
By section 17, when the Commission receives a copy of an admission or renewal order, it must direct a
member of the panel to examine the patient, review their records and to interview the consultant
psychiatrist, in order to determine in the interest of the patient whether the patient is suffering from a
mental disorder. 
Within 14 days, the panel member must provide the tribunal with a written report on the results of the
examination, interview and review, and copy it to the patient’s legal representative. The tribunal must
have regard to this report before determining the review.
Mental Health Legal Aid Scheme
The Commission assigns a legal representative to represent the patient, from the Mental Health Legal
Aid Scheme, unless the patient engages a solicitor themselves. According to the Commission, the purpose
of assigning a legal representative is to enable the patient to present their case to the tribunal in person
or through the legal representative, so that their views are articulated and any relevant material or
submissions are placed before the tribunal. Where a patient is unable or unwilling to give instructions,
the appropriate course for the legal representative will be to listen to the patient’s views and to articulate
them in the patient’s best interest. A legal representative appearing before the tribunal in proceedings
under this Act shall be entitled to the same privileges and immunities as a legal representative in a court.
The tribunal must arrange to give the patient or their legal representative a copy of any psychiatric report
furnished to the tribunal under section 17, and also an indication in writing of the nature and source of
any relevant information which has come to their notice in the course of the review.
4 Unless a case referred to in this article has been given a formal citation, the case is unreported, in which case the date of the
judgment is given; any quotations and observations are based on the transcript of the judgment. Many of the transcripts have
been published on the Mental Health Commission’s website (www.mhcirl.ie) and the website of the British and Irish Legal
Information Institute (www.bailii.org).
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The Commission is developing quality assurance proposals for legal representatives of the kind developed
by the Legal Services Commission in England and Wales. The initial position taken by the Law Society
was not to accept them. There is no good evidence base in England and Wales that supports the view that
these kinds of bureaucratic intervention by non-practitioners adds anything to the protection afforded to
clients by professional training, a professional code and investigation by the professional body. There is
much anecdotal evidence to suggest that such measures drive practitioners away from legal aid work. The
key to any successful professional service is recruiting good calibre candidates, good training, continuing
education, adequate funding and a strong professional body that is able to enforce standards of conduct.
Rules and procedure
There are no tribunal rules. Much is therefore left to a tribunal’s discretion although section 49 makes
some provision for giving directions and similar matters:
Directions concerning the A tribunal may, for the purposes of its functions, direct in writing the
attendance of the patient responsible consultant psychiatrist to arrange for the patient to
attend before it. However, a patient shall not be required to attend if,
in the opinion of the tribunal, such attendance might be prejudicial
to his or her mental health, well-being or emotional condition.
Directions concerning the A tribunal may, for the purposes of its functions, direct in writing any
attendance of witnesses person whose evidence is required by the tribunal to attend before it.
The reasonable expenses of witnesses directed to attend shall be paid
by the Commission.
Directions concerning the A tribunal may, for the purposes of its functions, direct any person
production of documents attending before it to produce to the tribunal any document or thing
in his or her possession or power specified in the direction. It may
also direct in writing any person to send to it any document or thing
in his or her possession.
General power to give directions A tribunal may, for the purposes of its functions, give any other
directions for the purpose of the proceedings concerned that appear
to it to be reasonable and just.
The hearing
The Commission has set a standard that a minimum of three days notice of a hearing must be given to
members and those required to attend.
Tribunal hearings are generally held at approved centres and the Commission appoints a Mental Health
Tribunal Clerk to provide administrative assistance to the tribunal.
At a sitting of a tribunal, each member of the tribunal has a vote, and every question must be determined
by a majority vote, including it seems points of law.
A tribunal must ‘hold sittings’ when undertaking a review. In other words, the statute precludes making
a decision on the papers. 
At sittings, the tribunal ‘may receive submissions and such evidence as it thinks fit.’ By section 49, the
tribunal must, however, make provision for:
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(a) notifying the consultant psychiatrist responsible … and the patient or his or her legal
representative of the date, time and place of the relevant sitting of the tribunal,
(b) giving the patient … or his or her legal representative a copy of any report furnished to the
tribunal under section 17 and an indication in writing of the nature and source of any
information relating to the matter which has come to notice in the course of the review,
(c) subject to subsection (11), enabling the patient … and his or her legal representative to be
present at the relevant sitting … and enabling the patient … to present his or her case … in
person or through a legal representative,
(d) enabling written statements to be admissible as evidence … with the consent of the patient or
… representative,
(e) the examination by or on behalf of the tribunal and the cross-examination by or on behalf of the
patient … (on oath or otherwise as it may determine) of witnesses before the tribunal called by it,
(f) the examination by or on behalf of the patient … and the cross-examination by or on behalf of
the tribunal … of witnesses before the tribunal called by the patient the subject of the review,
(g) the determination by the tribunal whether evidence at the tribunal should be given on oath,
(h) the administration by the tribunal of the oath to witnesses before the tribunal, and
(i) the making of a sufficient record of the proceedings of the tribunal.
According to the Procedural Guidance & Administrative Protocols, ‘To put the patient at ease, it is
recommended that where it is required that evidence be taken directly from the patient this be done as
early in the hearing as is reasonably possible. Due consideration should be given by the mental health
tribunal to each patient’s mental health, well being or emotional condition when evidence is being heard.’
Whether proceedings are inquisitorial or adversarial
The Procedural Guidance & Administrative Protocols also state that ‘the Mental Health Commission takes
the view that under no circumstances should mental health tribunals be conducted in an adversarial
manner. An inquisitorial approach which seeks to protect each patient’s human rights and is governed by
best interest principles, Section 4(1), is viewed by the Commission as the most effective manner in which
to conduct a mental health tribunal.’
Although such a view has also sometimes been advanced by the senior courts in England and Wales, it is
difficult to view such a statement as anything other than a fairly complete misunderstanding of the legal
position. Mental Health Tribunal proceedings do, of course, have strong inquisitorial elements. For
example, the tribunal members determine the procedure and call and question witnesses. However,
equally obviously, there are strong adversarial elements, that are not part of a pure inquisitorial approach.
Generally, there are parties, and those parties have rights. The patient has statutory rights to be present
and to present their case; to call witnesses; and to cross-examine witnesses. Written statements are only
admissible as evidence with the consent of the patient or their representative. The model is therefore a
mixed inquisitorial-adversarial model, but hopefully not confrontational.
Right to a hearing in public
By section 49(9), ‘sittings of a tribunal … shall be held in private.’ Unlike in England and Wales, no
provision at all is made for a public hearing at the request of the patient. In due course, the argument will
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no doubt be made in some case that an absolute bar of this kind contravenes Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. It is necessary to balance the patient’s desire for a hearing in public
against, having regard to matters such as their reasons for requesting a public hearing and the likely effects
on their mental state, treatment and rehabilitation.
The tribunal’s powers
The tribunal must conduct its review and make its decision within 21 days of the making of the order. It
must affirm the order if it is satisfied that the patient is suffering from mental disorder and that any failure
to comply with the statutory admission or renewal procedures has not caused injustice or affected the
substance of the order.
The tribunal has a limited power to extend the usual 21-day duration of an admission order. Section 18(2)
provides that the tribunal shall make its decision no later than 21 days after the making of the admission
order (or the renewal order). However, by sub-section (4), this period may be extended by order of the
tribunal for a further period of 14 days, either on its own motion or at the request of the patient. It may
then be further extended by order of the tribunal for a second period of 14 days, but in this case only on
the application of the patient, and only if the tribunal is satisfied that it is in the interests of the patient.
Where an extension is given, the admission order (or renewal order) continues in force during the period
of the extension.
In T O’D v Central Mental Hospital, HSE (Respondent) and Mental Health Commission (Notice Party) (25
April 2007), the Central Mental Hospital made a series of very basic errors in relation to the new
detention provisions. On 6 December 2006, a renewal order was not made in time and the patient
became a voluntary patient. He expressed an intention to leave and an admission order was made under
section 24. For the second time, the hospital failed to renew an order in time, so the patient again became
a voluntary patient. He again indicated a wish to leave, on 17 January 2007, and was detained. However,
the admission order required by section 24 was not signed for a week, until 24 January. On review, the
tribunal affirmed the admission order.
Mr Justice Charleton upheld the patient’s detention, stating that a purposive approach to the legislation
is required, that section 4 (best interests) infuses the entire legislation, and that the tribunal was entitled
to take best interests into account. Indeed, had the tribunal not taken section 4 into account, that would
have been grounds for judicial review:
“26. … I have no doubt that in referring to these sections that concern the administration of
involuntary detention, s.18(1) refers to the entirety of them and not simply to more minor matters as
to typing, time or procedure. I would hold that the purpose of s.18(1) [tribunal’s jurisdiction and
powers] is to enable the Mental Health Tribunal to consider afresh the detention of mental patients
and to determine, notwithstanding that there may have been defects as to their detention, whether
the order of admission or renewal before them should now be affirmed. In doing so, the Mental Health
Tribunal looks at the substance of the order. This, in my judgment, means that they are concerned
with whether the order made is technically valid, in terms of the statutory scheme set up by the Act
or, if it is not, whether the substance of the order is sufficiently well justified by the condition of the
patient.
In this regard, the Mental Health Tribunal was entitled to have regard to the fact that Mr O’D. was
at all material times suffering from a serious psychiatric illness which required that he should be
treated and which treatment was of assistance to him and to the community. In addition, they were
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obliged, in my judgment, to have regard to the fact that if the applicant had been discharged, which
would have been the effect of their refusal to uphold the order, the applicant himself would have been
at immediate risk from his paranoid delusional fantasies as would those with whom he might come
into close contact. I would specifically hold that the purpose of s. 18(1) of the Act is to enable the
Tribunal to affirm the lawfulness of a detention which has become flawed due to a failure to comply
with relevant time limits.”
A somewhat different approach was taken in WQ v Mental Health Commission, Central Mental Hospital,
Mental Health Tribunal (Respondents) (15 May 2007), where Mr Justice O’Neill stated that section18(1)
only excuses failures of a minor or insubstantial nature, which do not cause injustice. This approach is
likely to be preferred to that of Mr Justice Charleston.
The tribunal’s decision and reasons
The tribunal’s decision must be recorded on a form prescribed by the Commission. Form 8 is used to
record decisions to affirm or revoke an admission or renewal order. Form 9 is used to record decisions to
extend the period of an admission or renewal order by up to 14 days. Adjournments are, of course,
sometimes necessary.
The tribunal’s decision and reasons must be given in writing to the Commission, the consultant
psychiatrist responsible for the patient, the patient, their legal representative, and to any other person to
whom, in the opinion of the tribunal, such notice should be given. The Commission guidelines state that
decisions should wherever reasonably possible be given on the day of the hearing; and if not, as soon as
possible thereafter and within the period specified in the Act.
Adequacy of reasons
According to Mr Justice Neill, in MR v Cathy Byrne & Others, Sligo Mental Health Services Respondent) and
Mental Health Tribunal (Notice Party) (2 March 2007),
“In approaching an assessment of the decision of the Tribunal as revealed by the record of it, both as
to substance and form, in my view, it is not appropriate to subject the record to intensive dissection,
analysis and construction, as would be the case when dealing with legally binding documents such as
statutes, statutory instruments or contracts. The appropriate approach is to look at the record as a
whole and take from it the sense and meaning that is revealed from the entirety of the record. This
must be done also in the appropriate context; namely the record must be seen as the result of a
hearing which has taken place immediately before the creation of the record, and it must be read in
the context of the evidence both oral and written which has just been presented to the Tribunal. The
record is not to be seen as, or treated as a discursive judgment, but simply as the record of a decision
made contemporaneously, on specific evidence or material, within a specific statutory framework. i.e.
the relevant sections of the Act of 2001 as set out above.”
While that is generally correct, it would appear that a very low standard indeed was set in this case. 
The tribunal’s reasons did not reveal any consideration at all of whether the applicant’s condition would
deteriorate, whether the absence of a renewal order would prevent the administration of appropriate
treatment that could only be given by involuntary admission, or whether the patient’s condition would
benefit to a material extent by the making of the renewal order. In addition, the tribunal’s finding, that
“In the event of her being changed to a voluntary status compliance with medication and D.T. would not
be guaranteed”, applied an inappropriate test or standard.
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The overriding test must surely always be whether the tribunal is providing both parties with the materials
which will enable them to know that the tribunal has made no error of law in reaching its finding of fact.5
The patient must know why the case advanced in detail on his behalf had not been accepted.6 Proper,
adequate and intelligible reasons should be given which grapple with the important issues raised and can
reasonably be said to deal with the substantial points that have been raised.7 However, the reasons for the
decision cannot be read “in the air”. Although the reasons may not be clear or immediately intelligible
on their face, the decision is addressed to parties, who are an informed audience and so well aware of what
issues were raised and the nuances raised by those issues.8 Nor should the reasons be subjected to the
analytical treatment more appropriate to the interpretation of a statute or a deed. The necessity for giving
reasons is often underscored by the fact that it is often very important to know the reason why an
application has been turned down. 
Privilege
Tribunal documents, reports and statements are absolutely privileged.
Circuit Court appeals
Section 19 provides for an appeal to the Circuit Court against a decision of a tribunal. No appeal lies
against an order of the Circuit Court other than an appeal on a point of law to the High Court.
If the tribunal affirms the order being reviewed, the patient has 14 days within which to appeal to the
Circuit Court. The Circuit Court will revoke an order if it is shown to its satisfaction that the patient is
not suffering from mental disorder at the time of the Circuit Court hearing. As drafted, the Circuit Court
is not concerned with the second issue of failure to comply with the statutory procedures.
The procedure for Circuit Court appeals is set out in Order 47A of the Circuit Court Rules 2001, which
was inserted by the Circuit Court Rules (Mental Health) 2007. It takes some three to four weeks to get a
hearing in Dublin. In other areas, such as Galway, it seems that appeals have been given no priority and
must take their place in the list.
The fact that the Circuit Court is not concerned with a tribunal’s finding as to whether any failure to
comply with the statutory admission or renewal procedures has caused injustice or affected the substance
of the order may be unfortunate. It means that the way of appealing this part of the tribunal’s finding is
through habeas corpus or judicial review proceedings. Arguably, a single appeal procedure, encompassing
both factual and legal findings, would be more efficient.
Habeas corpus and Article 40.4
Challenges to admission and renewal orders, and to tribunal decisions, may also be brought by way of
habeas corpus proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution of Ireland:
40.4. 1° No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.
2° Upon complaint being made by or on behalf of any person to the High Court or any judge
5 Bone v. Mental Health Review Tribunal [1985] 3 All
E.R. 330; Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v.
Crabtree [1974] I.C.R. 120 at 122.
6 R. v. Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex p. Clatworthy
[1985] 3 All E.R. 699. 
7 R. v. Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex p. Pickering
[1986] 1 All E.R. 99; Bone v. Mental Health Review
Tribunal [1985] 3 All E.R. 330; Seddon Properties Ltd. v.
Secretary of State for the Environment (1978) 42 P. &
C.R. 26; Re Poyser and Mills’s Arbitration [1964] 2 Q.B.
467 at 478.
8 R. v. Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex p. Pickering
[1986] 1 All E.R. 99.
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thereof alleging that such person is being unlawfully detained, the High Court and any and every
judge thereof to whom such complaint is made shall forthwith enquire into the said complaint and
may order the person in whose custody such person is detained to produce the body of such person
before the High Court on a named day and to certify in writing the grounds of his detention, and
the High Court shall, upon the body of such person being produced before that Court and after
giving the person in whose custody he is detained an opportunity of justifying the detention, order
the release of such person from such detention unless satisfied that he is being detained in
accordance with the law …
Where the High Court has ordered a patient’s release, it has often directed delayed release in order to
allow time for the patient to be detained under a valid admission order.
As previously noted, the court has taken a paternalistic approach to the legislation.
§4 – CONCLUDING REMARKS
There is much to commend. The strengths of the legislation include a relatively strong Mental Health
Commission; supervision by tribunals of proposed transfers to the Central Mental Hospital; automatic
tribunal referrals following admission and renewal; and the holding of tribunal hearings within 21 days.
On the debit side, the drafting is often weak. Apart from the ambiguities already referred to, there are no
rectification provisions, which is an unfortunate error. No provision is made for transfers in and out of the
jurisdiction, in particular with the United Kingdom.
There are also significant omissions compared with United Kingdom statutes. For example, the statute
does not contain any community alternatives to detention, such as guardianship or supervision orders.
There are no rehabilitation provisions of the kind found in Northern Irish legislation. The role of the
applicant is limited to triggering a medical admissions process, rather than deciding whether an
application is appropriate having regard to the medical recommendations. There is no duty to provide
after-care to persons discharged from section. No provision is made for patients’ correspondence or for
making admission orders in criminal proceedings; and nor are there any pre-trial diversion powers. As in
Northern Ireland, the legislation is very much based on a medical model: the psychiatric profession is
dominant; the consent to treatment provisions are weak; the tribunal and legal representation and legal
aid schemes are administered through a health service body; the next-of-kin or nearest relative has no
power to discharge the patient or to block admission in cases where dangerousness is not an issue9; there
are no independent managers of approved centres with discharge powers; and the Inspector of Mental
Health Services must be a consultant psychiatrist. Furthermore, the tribunal’s powers are relatively
limited when reviewing an admission or renewal order. They may discharge or not discharge. There is no
power to direct discharge on a future date, and no power to direct or recommend leave or transfer.
Patients have no statutory right to obtain their own psychiatric report, and there is no after-care or social
circumstances assessment to aid the tribunal. Overall, the scheme is good but not the best.
9 This is perhaps slightly surprising given that Article 41 of the Constitution provides that, ‘1° The State recognises the Family as
the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible
rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law. 2° The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution
and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State.’
